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1. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (discussing
“desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals . . . and the necessity
of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments”); see
also La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating
that the problem before the Court “involve[d] the application of standards of fairness and justice
broadly conceived . . . . [N]ot the application of merely personal standards but the impersonal
standards of society which alone judges as the Organs of Law are empowered to enforce”
(emphasis added)).
2. See infra Part I.
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In theory the law creates impersonal rules of behavior that courts apply in an
identical fashion regardless of the litigant.   Ideally, the powerful and powerless1
can expect to follow the same rules of law and procedure in any courtroom.
Through neutral rules of practice and procedure, the courts seek to assure an
equal opportunity for a full and fair hearing to all parties.  Of course, the world
is not perfect and there are obvious variables ranging from the lawyers’ abilities,
to the financial wherewithal of the parties that might affect the process of
litigation.  Yet, courts could apply their rules in a similar fashion to all with the
hope that such a system will produce a just result.
Somewhere this ideal of neutrality has derailed in favor of an incongruous,
ad hoc set of rules applicable only to pro se litigants.   While courts arguably2
intended some of these rules to benefit the pro se litigant and to ease the
disadvantage of proceeding without counsel, in practice, even benign rules have
worked to disfavor or even punish the pro se litigant.  The result is that ad hoc
rules designed to protect pro se litigants are often doing just the opposite.  This
Article endeavors to (1) trace the set of rules that apply uniquely to pro se
litigants, (2) explore how those rules derailed, and (3) suggest a path for
restoration of the impersonal ideal that once underlay the legal fabric of
American law.
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3. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing the notice element of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8).
4. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 27 (1986) (noting that the Court had “rejected
an approach that pleading [was] a game of skill in which one misstep [could] be decisive” (citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1968-69 (2007))); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962) (stating that it is “entirely
contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be
avoided on the basis of . . . mere technicalities”).
5. See, e.g., Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[A]ppellant’s
pro se status does not excuse the obligation of any litigant to comply with the fundamental
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d
565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants.”).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  For further discussion on Rule 8 pleading requirements, see
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68 (6th ed. 2002).
7. The Rules arose out of an evolving American movement away from the formal rigidity
of the common law pleading practice and toward a more simplified pleading system.  See JACK
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.1 (4th ed. 2005); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, §§
66, 68.  In accord with this movement, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rules in 1938.  See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, § 5.7, at 267.  Of particular note, Rule 8 simplified and liberalized the
federal pleading standard, creating a process in which the primary function of the complaint is to
give fair notice to the adverse party.  See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, § 5.7; WRIGHT & KANE,
supra note 6, § 68, at 471.
8. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“The liberal notice pleading
of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus
I.  THE DILEMMA
The schism that has developed in the treatment of pro se litigation is the by-
product of two conflicting goals used in the evaluation of pro se pleadings.  The
first objective involves the measures used to assess whether the pleading
sufficiently states a claim for relief.   Part of this objective seeks to assure that3
mere procedural technicalities do not trip up the unwary litigant.   The second,4
somewhat incongruous goal, deals with the basic notion that both the represented
and unrepresented must follow the same procedural rules.5
A.  Inconsistencies with the Liberalized Pleading Standard of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The first objective in the evaluation of pleadings is captured in the well-
known terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 8(a)(2), which provides
that a pleading setting out a claim for relief need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”   This liberal6
pleading requirement reflects a long-established policy move away from the
technical or stylized pleading forms of earlier common law practice.   Under the7
Rules, the function of pleading a claim for relief  is to give sufficient notice to8
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litigation on the merits of a claim.”).
9. The Supreme Court initially addressed the function of a pleading in Conley, 355 U.S. at
47-48.  The Court faced a challenge to the sufficiency of a complaint against a union by African-
American railway workers who had alleged racial discrimination in violation of federal law.  Id. at
42-43.  In upholding the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court clarified that the plaintiffs need not
set out specific or detailed facts to support a claim for relief.  Id. at 47.  Rule 8 simply required “‘a
short and plain statement of the claim’ that [would] give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim [was] and the grounds upon which it rest[ed].”  Id.  The Court made clear that the
plaintiff was not obligated to “detail the facts on which he base[d] his claim.”  Id.  In giving effect
to these notice pleading requirements and the directive of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f),
which requires construction of pleadings “to do substantial justice,” the Supreme Court made clear
that “[t]he Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is
to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”  Id. at 48; accord Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 434 (1986)
(noting that “Conley v. Gibson put the Supreme Court on record as clearly favoring the liberal view
[of pleading]”); see also infra notes 11-29 and accompanying text.
10. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 7, § 5.7; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, § 68, at
470-71, 473-74 (both noting that the Rules include techniques such as discovery and summary
judgment to fill the roles of determining all the facts, narrowing the issues, and providing speedy
disposition); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12 (stating that Rule 8(a) requires that a Title
VII plaintiff plead enough to provide notice of the claim, but need not allege a prima facie case);
United States v. N. Trust Co., 372 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Even with respect to elements
of the plaintiff's claim, complaints need not plead facts or legal theories.”); Fontana v. Haskin, 262
F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Specific legal theories need not be pleaded so long as sufficient
factual averments show that the claimant may be entitled to some relief.”); Simonton v. Runyon,
232 F.3d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2000) (“‘[G]enerally a complaint that gives full notice of the
circumstances giving rise to the plaintiff's claim for relief need not also correctly plead the legal
theory or theories and statutory basis supporting the claim.’” (quoting Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v.
Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980))); C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A complaint need not specify the correct legal theory, or point to the right
statute, to survive a motion to dismiss.”); Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 167 (5th Cir.
2000) (“‘The form of the complaint is not significant if it alleges facts upon which relief can be
granted, even if it fails to categorize correctly the legal theory giving rise to the claim.’” (quoting
Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 604 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))); Williams v. Midwest
Airlines, 321 F. Supp. 2d 993, 994 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (“It is not necessary for a plaintiff to identify
in the complaint the legal theories on which he intends to proceed.”).
11. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968-69
(2007).
the adverse party  even if the plaintiff fails to adequately identify the legal theory9
for relief or detail relevant facts.10
Over fifty years ago the Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson  set out to11
create a broad, principled method for judges to use in assessing the facial validity
of a complaint based on the language and purpose of the liberalized system of
22 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:19
12. Id. at 45-46.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 6, § 68.  As Professor Charles Wright observes,
whether a plaintiff is pro se or represented by counsel, a complaint cannot be dismissed unless
it appears to a certainty that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that can be
proved in support of its allegations.  This rule, which has been stated literally thousands
of times, precludes final dismissal for insufficiency of the complaint except in the
extraordinary case in which the pleader makes allegations that show on the face of the
complaint some insuperable bar to relief.
Id. at 474 (footnote omitted).
15. As the Court recently observed in Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969, “a good many judges and
commentators have balked at taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard.”
(citing Ascon Props., Inc v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989); McGregor v.
Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1988); Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984); O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir.
1976)).
16. Only those claims that “beyond doubt . . . the plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in
support of his claim would entitle him to relief” could be dismissed.  Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
17. See Car Carriers, Inc., 745 F.2d at 1106 (“Conley has never been interpreted literally.”
(citing Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984))); see also Twombly, 127
S. Ct. at 1969 (stating that Conley’s “no set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and
explained away”).
18. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1672
(1998) (while noting Rule 8 and compliance with Conley v. Gibson appears to permit a litigant to
simply state the parties’ names and a demand for judgment, in reality “plaintiffs in American
litigation actually plead with the kind of specificity required elsewhere in the world.  Doing so helps
the judge understand what the case is about, and it incidentally helps the opposing side”); Marcus,
supra note 9, at 462-65; see also Ascon Props., Inc., 866 F.2d at 1155 (noting that Conley
notice pleading.   The oft-quoted language of Conley provides:  “[W]e follow,12
of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”13
Following Conley, the conventional wisdom was that a pleading could pass
muster as long as the claimant could prove any set of facts, consistent with the
complaint, which might justify relief.   While this liberal standard of pleading14
interpretation theoretically prevented dismissal of a complaint due simply to
defects in form or inartful pleading style, critics asserted that under this broad
standard virtually any complaint or claim could survive a motion to dismiss.15
Indeed, this liberal standard of pleading review would permit many implausible
claims to survive a motion to dismiss.   Moreover, since the system allowed16
implausible claims to survive the pleading stage of litigation, the stated test rarely
commanded the degree of obedience from the courts that one would have
expected.17
Virtually from the start, courts devised inroads which would permit more
careful scrutiny of claims regarded as implausible.   For example while federal18
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“unfortunately provided conflicting guideposts” and stating that the Supreme Court had “elsewhere
hinted that sometimes more particularity in pleading [could] be required”); Car Carriers, Inc., 745
F.2d at 1106 (stating that “Conley has never been interpreted literally” (citing Sutliff, 727 F.2d at
654)).
19. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
(2005)).
20. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
526 (1983) (“It is not . . . proper to assume that the Union can prove facts that it has not alleged or
that the defendants have violated the antitrust laws in ways that have not been alleged.”); see also
McGregor, 856 F.2d at 43 (stating that “‘when a plaintiff . . . supplies facts to support his claim,
we do not think that Conley imposes a duty on the courts to conjure up unpleaded facts that might
turn a frivolous claim into a substantial one . . . . [W]hen a complaint omits facts that, if they
existed, would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not exist’”
(quoting O’Brien, 544 F.2d at 546 n.3 (citations omitted))).
21. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (recognizing the Conley pleading standard,
but adding that “it is within the trial court’s power to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by
amendment to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed
supportive of plaintiff’s standing”); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (stating
that on review of the sufficiency of a complaint, the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
22. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1959 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
23. See O’Brien, 544 F.2d at 546 n.3 (“[W]hen a plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 supplies
facts to support his claim, we do not think that [Conley] imposes a duty on the courts to conjure up
unpleaded facts that might turn a frivolous claim of unconstitutional official action into a substantial
one.”); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978) (dictum) (suggesting that
“[i]nsubstantial” cases can be dismissed despite “artful pleading”).  But cf.  Hazard, supra note 18,
at 1672 (“Although Rule 8 permits a claimant to plead in vacuous terms, ordinarily plaintiffs in
American litigation actually plead with the kind of specificity required elsewhere in the world.”);
Marcus, supra note 9, at 434 (“Although Conley v. Gibson put the Supreme Court on record as
clearly favoring the liberal view, the actual application of its admonition in subsequent cases was
more problematic.”).
24. Prisoner litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon.  See Brian Ostrom et al., Congress,
courts acknowledged the extraordinarily liberal pleading standard articulated in
Conley, federal courts also:  (1) interjected a requirement that the claimant have
a “‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process [would] reveal relevant
evidence’ to support [the] claim”;  (2) declined to assume facts not alleged;  (3)19 20
rejected allegations in a complaint that were regarded as “conclusory” or
“conjectural”;  and (4) emphasized that Rule 8 requires “that the ‘plain21
statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”22
The inconsistency between the language of Conley and the reality of practice
proved transparent, as courts frequently gave lip-service to Conley’s sweeping
language while creating more and more ways to restrict litigation regarded as
implausible or frivolous.23
This phenomenon proved to be particularly pronounced in prisoner
litigation,  where many ad hoc, unskilled claimants proceeded pro se and24
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Courts and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1525, 1529-32 (2003); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A
Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558-64 (2006) [hereinafter
Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions]; see also Drew Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The
Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 1537, 1539-46 (2005) (discussing a general rise of pro se litigation).
The rise of modern prisoner litigation can be traced to the general expansion of civil rights
litigation that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s.  See Ostrom et al., supra, at 1529-32;
Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra, at 558-61. 
By the mid-1960s, federal courts provided remedies to prisoners seeking relief from
unconstitutional prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546,
546 (1964) (per curiam) (holding that a prisoner had stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 when he had alleged denial of “permission to purchase certain religious publications and
denied other privileges enjoyed by other prisoners”).
By 1973, the Court acknowledged “recent decisions upholding the right of state prisoners to
bring federal civil rights actions to challenge the conditions of their confinement.”  Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498 (1973).  The cases that the Rodriguez court acknowledged were
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 1519 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton
v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); and Cooper, 378 U.S. 546.  The Court found that such cases
“establish that a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional
challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.”
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 499.
Some prisoner litigation involves class action suits brought against prison officials or other
appropriate authorities for large-scale, systemic, and supervised injunctions against unconstitutional
conditions of confinement.  See Ostrom et al., supra, at 1527-28; Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Judicial Policy Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617, 618-19
(2003) (discussing role of court in creating prison reform policy); Schlanger, Civil Rights
Injunctions, supra, at 558-69; see also Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004) (class action
brought by death row inmates housed in Unit 32-C at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, involving
numerous allegations concerning unconstitutional living conditions on Death Row); Armstrong v.
Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (class action brought by disabled California prisoners who
obtained system-wide injunctive relief for statutory violations); Harris v. Angelina County, 31 F.3d
331 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court injunction in a prisoner class action that imposed
a cap on the number of prisoners as a remedy to unconstitutional conditions of confinement); Knop
v. Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (class action prisoner suit in which the district
court ordered the prison to provide inmates with adequate winter clothing and adequate access to
lavatory facilities).
Other prison litigation involves a single prisoner, often proceeding pro se, seeking injunctive
or monetary redress for individual grievances such as use of excessive force by prison officials,
unconstitutional living conditions, risk of harm from other prisoners, and deliberate indifference
to medical needs.  See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (stating that prison
officials’ deliberate indifference to substantial risk of serious harm, including risk of harm from
other prisoners, may violate the Eighth Amendment and is, therefore, actionable in a § 1983
proceeding); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976) (stating that deliberate indifference to
a prisoner’s medical needs may violate the Eighth Amendment and, therefore, is actionable in a §
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1983 proceeding); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) (involving an inmate’s
allegations of “a prolonged and sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation”); Lenz v. Wade
490 F.3d 991, 993-94 (8th Cir. 2007) (involving a prisoner’s allegation of excessive force).
25. See Ostrom et al., supra note 24, at 1539-40 (graphically illustrating and analyzing the
large number of court dismissals).
26. While prisoner litigation expanded dramatically, many pro se prisoner claims were
dismissed as frivolous.  See Jon Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in
Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 519 (1996).  By the mid-1990s, both types—class-action suits
and suits raising individual prisoner claims—of prisoner litigation came under significant scrutiny
and a great deal of criticism.  See, e.g., Lynn Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional
Officials Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 520-26 (2001) (noting the mid-1990’s
responses of (1) state attorney generals, (2) Congress and (3) the Second Circuit); Newman, supra,
at 520-26; Ostrom et al., supra note 24, at 1525-27; Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1771-
73 (2003); Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 24, at 589-602; Margo Schlanger, Inmate
Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1626-33 (2003) [hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation];
Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J.
1, 18-20 (1997); see generally Michael Zachary, Dismissal of Federal Actions and Appeals Under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915a(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) and The Inherent Authority of the
Federal Courts: (A) Procedures for Screening and Dismissing Cases; (B) Special Problems Posed
By the “Delusional” or “Wholly Incredible” Complaint, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 975 (1999-2000)
(discussing statutory changes PLRA brought to prisoner litigation).
27. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text. 
28. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969-74 (2007).
29. The Supreme Court observed, “[A] good many judges and commentators have balked at
taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard.”  Id. at 1969.  Joining these
critics, the Court added:
To be fair to the Conley Court, the passage should be understood in light of the
opinion’s preceding summary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court
quite reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief.  But the passage so often
quoted fails to mention this understanding on the part of the Court, and after puzzling
the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.  The
phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading
standard:  once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.
frequently raised claims that courts deemed implausible or frivolous.   Rather25
than confront this disconnect between reality and the pleading ideal, avoidance
became a particularly powerful incentive as courts struggled to confront a rapid
rise in prisoner litigation.   The result was that many claims regarded as26
implausible, nonetheless, easily survived the conventional test for dismissal.27
With continued attention to implausible claims, the Supreme Court recently
elevated the legal consequences of skepticism.   In doing so, the Supreme Court28
treated the fifty-year-old Conley standard as if it were but a relic  and held that29
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Id.
30. Id. at 1974.
31. See, e.g., Pomales v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc., 342 F.3d 44, 49 n.4 (1st Cir. 2003)
(“[Plaintiff’s] temporary pro se status did not absolve her of the need to comply with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or the district court’s procedural rules.”); Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235
F.3d 540, 549 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Although pro se litigants get the benefit of more generous
treatment in some respects, they must nonetheless follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants.”); LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Although [pro
se] litigants should be afforded latitude, they ‘generally are required to inform themselves regarding
procedural rules and to comply with them.’” (quoting Edwards v. INS, 59 F.3d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted)).
32. See, e.g., Pierce v. City of Miami, 176 F. App’x 12, 14 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that
“although pro se litigants are still bound by rules of procedure, . . . they should not be held to the
same level of knowledge as an attorney”); In re T.R. Acquisition Corp., No. 99-5013, 1999 WL
753335, at *1 n.1 (2d Cir. Sept. 16, 1999) (noting that “[pro se] litigants . . . generally lack specific
knowledge of . . . legal procedures”).
33. For example, Rule 56(c) requires a party to present evidence if the adversary’s motion
for summary judgment would otherwise reflect the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(c).  Nonetheless, “[t]he majority of circuits have held that a pro se litigant is entitled
to notice of the consequences of a summary judgment motion and the requirements of the summary
judgment rule.”  United States v. Ninety-Three (93) Firearms, 2003 FED App. 0157P, at 20, 330
F.3d 414, 427 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing cases from the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits) (footnote omitted).
to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”30
B.  Equal Application of Procedural Rules and the Pro Se Litigant
The schism in American law also found expression in conflicting modes of
enforcement for procedural rules that were seemingly mandatory for all litigants.
Virtually all judges paid lip-service to the notion that pro se litigants had to
follow generally applicable procedural rules notwithstanding the litigant’s
frequent lack of legal training, education, and/or resources.   However, the31
inflexibility of this view implicates identical treatment for both plausible and
implausible claims.  The problem is that pro se litigants often lack the knowledge
or experience to discern differences in the requirements of various procedural
rules, such as the variety of responses required for an answer to a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.   This lack of knowledge could32
result in dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim.  Skeptical of the rigidity in
this approach, with identical treatment of counseled and uncounseled litigants,
courts struggled to create ways for plausible inmate suits to survive despite
procedural irregularities.
One such method involved the creation of ad hoc requirements for judges to
advise litigants about the rules before enforcing them.   While some courts have33
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34. See, e.g., Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir.
2007) (noting that “a district court may, without abusing its discretion, enter [an order dismissing
a pro se complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8] without attention to any particular
procedures”).
35. See, e.g., id. (noting that no particular warning must be given, but that a number of
criteria should be considered before dismissing a pro se complaint).
36. Id. at 1163; see also Howard Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the
Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 441-44 (1993) (discussing a prisoner’s ability as a pro
se plaintiff to draft viable complaints and the responses of the courts to liberally construe such pro
se pleadings).
37. Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1163 n.5 (“[W]e expect counsel to know the pleading rules of the
road without being given personal notice of them by the district court.  Our concern here is with
the [pro se] litigant unschooled in the law.”).
38. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007); see also supra notes 29-
30 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 443-44 (discussing courts’ treatment of pro se
prisoners); Marcus, supra note 9, at 477 (discussing the disproportionate treatment of pro se
prisoners in court dismissals of their complaints).
40. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
41. See Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 24, at 558-64 (discussing the
declined to require such advice,  even those courts have devised ways of34
protecting pro se litigants from procedural mishaps.   For example, one court35
recognized the power to dismiss claims that violate Rule 8, but suggested that
judges should not order dismissal of pro se complaints unless they have
explained for a “lay person . . . what judges and lawyers mean when speaking of
a short and plain statement consistent with Rule 8.”   In contrast, attorneys36
violating the rule do not receive the same judicial advice before their suits are
dismissed.37
II.  REACTION TO THE SCHISMS AND INTERPRETATIVE CONFLICTS:  EMERGENCE
OF MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO PRO SE LITIGATION
The schisms in the approaches to dismissal and procedural compliance have
coalesced in a multi-faceted blend in how judges approach pro se litigation.  The
liberality of the standard for dismissal would permit innumerable suits to proceed
despite deep skepticism of their underlying merit.  The recently-imposed test of
plausibility  creates an opportunity for courts to impose their own beliefs about38
the merit of the underlying suit despite the superficial liberality of the standard
for dismissal.  The continuum between the flexibility of Rule 8 and the subjective
ingredient of plausibility allows the courts to form ad hoc devices to impose their
own beliefs in a system supposedly based on objectivity and uniformity.
Even worse, a forum predicated on blind justice has evolved into a system
that reflects a keen eye for the persona of the litigant.   Certain rules govern pro39
se litigants, while other rules govern parties represented by lawyers.   Sometimes40
the pro se litigants are favored;  sometimes they are disfavored.   Moreover,41 42
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prisoners’ pro se litigation success in creating institutional change of the early 1960s and 1970s);
Swank, supra note 24, at 1552-53 (discussing a court based pro se assistance program).
42. Ostrom et al., supra note 24, at 1529-60 (noting the historical trends in treatment of pro
se prisoner claims both before and after the enactment of the PLRA and the statistical analysis of
case dismissals corresponding with those timelines); Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note
24, at 558-69; see also Swank, supra note 24, at 1548 (noting the negative anecdotal impressions
of pro se litigants).
43. See, e.g., Smith v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 254 F. App’x 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2007);
Harbulak v. Suffolk County, 654 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 1981).
44. When an attorney appears pro se, some courts have decided whether to liberally construe
the pleadings based on whether the litigant was practicing law at the time.  Compare Harbulak, 654
F.2d at 198 (holding that because a pro se litigant was a practicing lawyer, he was not entitled to
“the special consideration customarily” available to unrepresented parties), with N.Y. Presbyterian
Hosp., 254 F. App’x at 70 (even though “licensed attorneys” need not be afforded special “pleading
consideration” when they appear without legal representation, the plaintiff was entitled to treatment
as a pro se litigant because she had “not practiced law for years” as a result of “psychiatric
impairments”).  When the party is not an attorney, some courts have still applied “a sliding scale
of liberality” depending on the litigant’s level of experience in the legal system.  E.g., Standley v.
Dennison, No. 9:05-CV-1033 (GLS/GHL), 2007 WL 2406909, at *7-8 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2007);
Holsey v. Bass, 519 F. Supp. 395, 407 n.27 (D. Md. 1981); see also Michael J. Mueller, Note,
Abusive Pro Se Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts: Proposals for Judicial Control, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 93, 98 n.14 (1984) (“Some courts have adopted a ‘sliding scale of liberality’ that places
experienced pro se litigants somewhere between the uninitiated and trained lawyers.”).
45. Many legal scholars have written about the political, social and judicial reaction to the
prisoner litigation of the 1960s and 1970s.  See generally Branham, supra note 26, at 484-97;
Ostrom et al., supra note 24, at 1525-32; Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 24, at 550-
612; Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 26, at 1590-1627; Zachary, supra note 26 (comparing
throughout prisoner litigation pre-PLRA and post-PLRA).
46. See infra notes 55, 58 and accompanying text.
47. See Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented
Litigants, 27 J. NAT’L ASSOC. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 97, 101 (2007) (“Case after case announces ‘the
hoary but still vigorous rule’ that self-represented litigants are held to the same standard as
attorneys - and then case after case, often the same cases, describes exceptions to that rule and the
special treatment trial judges should accord to those without attorneys.” (quoting Gamet v.
Blanchard, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 447 (Dist. Ct. App. 2001))).
sometimes the pro se litigants are lawyers,  resulting in either foolish43
paternalism or unprincipled assessments of their legal ability.   The multiplicity44
of interpretative approaches and degrees of judicial intervention derive from the
array of subjective standards applied to review of pleadings, which, in turn,
evolve from judicial efforts to blend disparate tests, inconsistent approaches to
procedural requirements, and varying attitudes towards pro se litigation.45
With increasing subjectivity, courts have placed their gloss on various
procedural rules.   The opportunity to do so has resulted from the loosening of46
principle  and elevation of the judge’s dual role as the guardian and gatekeeper47
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48. For example, one cynic described the judge’s choice of competing principles when a party
appears pro se:
While the principles may govern the decisions in one sense, the facts drive the
selection of the principles.  One can almost predict the outcome, and the choice of
articulated principles, from the annoyance level of the court.  The more annoyed the
court is with an unrepresented litigant, the more likely the invocation of precedent
requiring impartiality, the application of similar rules, and a prohibition of playing
advocate for the litigant.  The more sympathetic the litigant, and the more the absence
of counsel seems beyond the litigant’s control, the more likely the court will be to
articulate a need to provide additional assistance to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2015 (1999).
49. 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
50. The passage from Haines is cited infra note 53.
51. The Conley pleading standard is set forth supra in the text accompanying note 13.  It is
important to remember that the Conley standard preceded the Twombly standard.
52. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the test in Haines is “whether the Court can say with assurance
on the basis of the complaint that, beyond any doubt, no set of facts could be proved that would
entitle the plaintiff to relief”).
53. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
54. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam) (in a post-Twombly
decision involving pro se prisoners, the Court noted that pro se pleadings must “‘be liberally
construed’” and are “‘held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’”
of pro se litigation.48
A.  Haines v. Kerner:  Enhanced Liberal Construction for Pro Se Pleadings
The dual rule of the judge is manifest in how courts have treated an
otherwise innocuous passage in the Haines v. Kerner  per curiam opinion issued49
thirty-six years ago.   In Haines, the Supreme Court applied the Conley pleading50
standard  for review of the viability of complaints in light of the litigant’s pro51
se status.   In that context, the Haines Court stated:52
Whatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the
internal administration of prisons, allegations such as those asserted by
petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the
opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance
that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears
“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”53
Although the Haines Court relaxed the pleading standard for the pro se plaintiff,
the Court did not define the degree of relaxation in comparison to the pro se
liberal notice pleading rules applicable to all litigants in Rule 8.   Not54
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(quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (majority opinion))).
55. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991),
opined:
A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.  We believe that this rule
means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which
the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper
legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence
construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.
Id. (citations omitted).
Perhaps echoing the policy of protection of prisoners and liberal construction of such pro se
pleadings, the District Court for Massachusetts stated:
As a marginalized group, prisoners are especially apt to require judicial protection.
The United States has both a strong commitment to human rights and a clear history of
human rights violations against prisoners, making such protection particularly
appropriate and necessary. In light of these legal and empirical factors, courts should
read prisoner petitions generously, give them careful consideration, and resolve
statutory ambiguities in prisoners’ favor.
Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 175 (D. Mass. 2004).
Some commentators have expressed concern that pro se pleadings actually are treated more
harshly than other pleadings, apparently in an effort to clear court dockets of unwanted litigation
involving pro se inmates.  Professor Howard Eisenberg observes:
Although courts routinely pay lip service to the liberal construction of pro se pleadings,
as required by the Supreme Court in Kerner, there is a nagging concern among those
few independent persons who have reviewed prisoner cases that the district courts are
actually applying very different criteria when trying to rid their docket of pesky prisoner
litigation.  One commentator, who reviewed only reported district and courts of appeal
decisions, found that a significant number of courts have applied stringent pleading
standards to pro se plaintiffs, ignoring the explicit directions of Haines v. Kerner or
“giving its language only superficial acknowledgment.”
Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 443 (footnote omitted) (citing and quoting Douglas A. Blaze,
Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation,
31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 971-72 (1990)).
56. One student commentator notes:
[The] limitation [in Haines] is read differently by each court in terms of how liberally,
and to which pleadings the rule applies.  This results in inconsistent treatment of pro se
litigants in the lower courts.  For example, some courts rely upon the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Haines to fashion a relaxed set of pro se standards for procedural
conformity, particularly when dealing with summary judgment proceedings, compliance
surprisingly, federal courts take varying approaches regarding “how liberal” the
construction of pro se pleadings should be.55
With the deterioration in objective standards and the intensification of
judges’ reliance on their own beliefs, the innocuous passage in Haines has
become a mirror for courts to act on their own perceptions of the plausibility of
the underlying litigation.   Ideally, under Haines, plausible claims proceed while56
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with discovery rules, the imposition of sanctions, and the introduction of evidence.  A
greater number of courts . . . take a more traditional approach and extend this sort of
pleading leniency only to the substantive issues raised, while continuing to strictly
enforce compliance with procedural requirements by pro se litigants.
Tiffany Buxton, Note, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 103, 117-18 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
57. See supra notes 47-48, 55 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1979) (Campbell, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the majority “ben[t] over backwards to excuse the omission of allegations of the
basic facts needed to make out a possible claim”).
59. See infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 100-01, 115-22 and
accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
64. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 101, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996).
65. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat.
implausible ones do not.  The trouble is that plausibility is inherently subjective
and judges likely gauge “plausibility” differently based on their ideologies,
attitudes, and experiences.
B.  The Rise in Subjectivity
Without objective standards to provide guidance, courts have chosen to
decide for themselves which pro se cases are plausible and which are not.   Not57
surprisingly, judges have erected their own artifices to allow pro se cases to
survive an infinite variety of procedural traps.58
Seeking to relieve pro se litigants of various procedural traps, courts have
created new, unanticipated dangers.  Tangibly, such relief has resulted in
unintended consequences for the litigants chosen for favorable treatment.59
Intangibly, judicial benevolence has resulted in a softening of the distinction
between advocacy and neutrality.   For example, courts have utilized ad hoc60
rules to interpret or advance a pro se litigant’s perceived grievance, such as
recharacterizing suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as habeas petitions,  advising61
litigants how to comply with rules,  and warning litigants of the need to comply62
with procedural requirements.   With the emergence of these rules, courts63
frequently struggle to maintain their neutrality when called on to perform
functions typically associated with advocacy.
Judicial efforts to forecast the effects of various constructions on the pro se
litigant illustrate this loss in objectivity.  Without legislative power, the judiciary
is at a loss to predict these effects.  Two examples arose in 1995 and 1996 with
Congress’s enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)  and64
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).   The two65
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1214 (1996).
66. See Newman, supra note 26, at 522.
67. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14, 413 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
68. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
69. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
71. 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
72. As noted earlier, often prisoner complaints involve inartful, mislabeled or muddled
allegations and claims for relief.  Often the litigants are poorly educated and are unable to craft a
document like a lawyer.  These defects often mean that the court has to wade through the pleading
to discern what the allegations are, what claims for relief these allegations support, and sometimes
even who the alleged defendants are.  See, e.g., Crooks v. Nix, 872 F.2d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 1989)
(employing liberal construction of pleading to discern relevant defendants and claims); Haley v.
Dormire, 845 F.2d 1488, 1490 (8th Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal of pro se prisoner complaint
because when “read expansively” the complaints set forth sufficient claims for relief); Massop v.
Coughlin, 770 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (although district court could not find a
constitutional claim based on the allegations in the prisoner’s complaint, Second Circuit remanded
finding that applying liberal standard of review, prisoner set forth sufficient allegations that the
prison guard intentionally injured him); Marshall v. Brierley, 461 F.2d 929, 930 (3rd Cir. 1972)
(reviewing complaint filed by a prisoner with “only minimal literary skills” and finding sufficient
grounds to allow complaint to go forward).
73. Judge Easterbrook explained, “A drafter who lacks a legal theory is likely to bungle the
complaint (and the trial); you need a theory to decide which facts to allege and prove.  But the
complaint need not identify a legal theory, and specifying an incorrect theory is not fatal.”
Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992); see also supra notes
13-17 and accompanying text.
laws brought to the surface the futility and danger of compensating for a party’s
lack of legal representation.
C.  The PLRA’s Impact on Judicial Construction of Pro Se Complaints
With the PLRA, Congress hoped to curtail the flood of inmate litigation.66
In many ways, the PLRA reflected legislative frustration with the rise of prisoner
litigation and the perceived intrusion of the federal judiciary in the operation of
state prison systems.   That frustration is evident in the statutory hurdles facing67
inmates who seek judicial review of prison conditions.  Two important
components of this effort were (1) the requirement of administrative exhaustion
of claims  and (2) restrictions on inmates’ eligibility for pauper status.68 69
The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies
before suing under federal law based on conditions within the prison.   The70
exhaustion provision creates tension with twenty-four years of precedent,
originating in Haines v. Kerner,  in which federal courts had struggled to71
identify the causes of action encompassed in many prisoner complaints.72
Federal courts have long discarded the ancient requirement for a litigant to
identify his legal theories in the complaint.   As a result, even for parties73
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74. Professors Wright and Miller state:
The federal rules, and the decisions construing them, evince a belief that when a party
has a valid claim, he should recover on it regardless of his counsel’s failure to perceive
the true basis of the claim at the pleading stage, provided always that a late shift in the
thrust of the case will not prejudice the other party in maintaining a defense upon the
merits.
5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  CIVIL § 1219,
at 281-83 (3d ed. 2004) (footnote omitted).
75. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
77. In many cases, courts dismiss prisoner pleadings based on the failure of the prisoner to
set out or adequately explain his claims and the court does not engage in an effort to create claims
of relief for the plaintiff or to try to help the plaintiff in setting out his claims.  See, e.g., Richards
v. Johnson, 115 F. App’x 677 (5th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where there was lack of
specificity in claims and defendants); McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating “[o]ur
duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled
allegations”).
78. In other cases, the courts appear to be more liberal in finding claims that may go forward
in a § 1983 action.  See, e.g., Dillier v. Williams, No. 93-56380, 1994 WL 10005, at *1-2 (9th Cir.
Jan. 13, 1994) (applying liberal pleading standard to inartful complaint, court found district court
erred in dismissal of complaint); Roundtree v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., No. CV-94-3833 (CPS), 1995
WL 428654, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1,1995) (noting that although inartfully pled, the plaintiff
nonetheless stated a claim with respect to constitutional deprivation due to prison transfer decision);
see also Marshall v. Brierley, 461 F.2d 929, 930 (3rd Cir. 1972) (reviewing complaint filed by a
prisoner with “only minimal literary skills” and finding sufficient grounds to allow complaint to go
forward).
79. See, e.g., Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because Burgos is a pro
enjoying legal representation, the courts read into the complaint all causes of
action fairly encompassed by the pleader’s factual allegations.   This exercise74
often proves to be simple when the plaintiff enjoys legal representation,  but the75
process becomes far more problematic when the plaintiff lacks legal training or
representation.   In the absence of such training or representation, litigants often76
try to express their claims without the ability to pinpoint the misdeeds that are
actionable.
Deciphering these complaints frequently required courts to decide whether
to err on the side of a narrow construction or a generous one.  One option
involved strict adherence to inartful and, perhaps, unintended language of the pro
se complaint itself.   Another option was to construe the complaint to fairly77
encompass all claims fairly raised by the pro se litigant’s pleading.78
Prior to 1996, courts had little reason to read complaints narrowly.  With
generous construction, courts could ferret out the viable claims, and if the courts
proved overly generous in their construction, pro se litigants could drop any
claims that they had not intended to insert.  As a result, judges often interpreted
pro se complaints to include whatever legal theories could be encompassed by
the plaintiff’s factual allegations.79
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se litigant, we read his supporting papers liberally, and will interpret them to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.”); White v. Wyrick, 530 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(“[W]e note that petitioner appears pro se and is entitled to have his pleadings interpreted liberally
and his petition should be construed to encompass any allegation stating federal relief . . . .”).
80. The exhaustion requirement can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
81. See, e.g., Patel v. Fleming, 415 F.3d 1105, 1109-11 (10th Cir. 2005) (dismissing
prisoner’s pro se complaint for failure to timely submit a written administrative remedy request even
though plaintiff claimed he was late in submitting because of an attempt to intentionally resolve his
second hand smoke damages); Bey v. Johnson, 2005 FED App. 0194P, 407 F.3d 801, 805-07 (6th
Cir. 2005) (adopting the “total exhaustion rule” so that any and all available remedies must have
been exhausted before a prisoner could bring any claims that were even remotely connected to
potential administrative remedies), vacated and remanded by 127 S. Ct. 1212 (2007); Graves v.
Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885-86 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (dismissing the claim because “it is clear
from the record that at least some of plaintiffs claims were unexhausted”).  The Supreme Court
ultimately rejected this approach.  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007) (concluding that
“exhaustion is not per se inadequate . . . . [L]eav[ing] it to the court below in the first instance to
determine the sufficiency of the exhaustion in these cases”).
82. E.g., Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 651 (2d Cir. 2004) (observing Second Circuit
conclusion that complete dismissal is not required under § 1997e).
83. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Dubuc v. Johnson, 314 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing “the irony
This type of construction seemed reasonable prior to 1996 and consistent
with the judiciary’s commitment to fairness and the elevation of substance over
form.  However, this liberal construction practice ultimately collided with the
PLRA exhaustion requirement.   Indeed, with the passage of the PLRA, a court’s80
commitment to generous construction often proved unfair to the very people it
intended to help.
For example, until recently, some courts “generously” read legal claims into
complaints only to dismiss the entire action if the plaintiff failed to exhaust even
a single theory.   The anomaly was that the theory might have been unexhausted81
only because the pro se litigant had not intended to assert it in the litigation as a
separate cause of action.  Benign in purpose, proactive construction of pro se
complaints has proved far from benign in result.
The same has often been true even in those courts that decline to dismiss the
entire action when some of the claims were exhausted and some were not.   In82
addition to requiring administrative exhaustion, Congress intensified the
requirements for pauper status for prisoners who had filed baseless lawsuits.83
Congress did so by treating dismissals for “frivolousness” or “failure to state a
valid claim” as “strikes.”   A prisoner could accumulate three “strikes” without84
a penalty, but once the inmate obtained three “strikes,” he could only gain pauper
status upon a showing that he was in imminent risk of serious bodily harm.85
With the statutory change, courts have struggled to determine when a “strike”
has taken place.   Some courts conclude that a “strike” occurs when a trial court86
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that ascertaining whether a particular prisoner litigant has accumulated at least three strikes may
require the use of more judicial resources than addressing the prisoner’s claims on the merits”).
87. See Pointer v. Wilkinson, 2007 FED App. 0363P, at 7, 502 F.3d 369, 377 (6th Cir. 2007)
(“[W]e hold that where a complaint is dismissed in part without prejudice for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and in part with prejudice because ‘it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted,’ the dismissal should be counted as a strike under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”); Comeaux v. Cockrell, 72 F. App’x 54, 55 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
(“The district court could dismiss part of [the plaintiff’s] complaint as malicious, which counted
as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), even though the case was ultimately dismissed for failure to
comply with court orders.”); Faust v. Parke, No. 96-3881, 1997 WL 284598, at *3 (7th Cir. May
22, 1997) (stating that a dismissal “counts as a strike” under § 1915(g), notwithstanding the court’s
decision not to retain jurisdiction over a constructive fraud claim); Eady v. Lappin, No. 9:05-CV-
0824, 2007 WL 1531879, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 2007) (adopting magistrate judge’s finding that
“a plaintiff might earn a strike because some of his claims were dismissed for frivolousness,
maliciousness or failure to state a claim”); Shaw v. Weaks, No. 06-2024-B/V, 2006 WL 1049307,
at *6 n.13 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 20, 2006) (“The fact that some of plaintiff’s claims in this action have
been dismissed for failure to exhaust does not preclude the imposition of a strike on the basis of
claims that were dismissed for failure to state a claim or as frivolous.”); Luedtke v. Bertrand, 32 F.
Supp. 2d 1074, 1076 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that dismissal of a corresponding state law
claim, without prejudice, based on a lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, “does not, and
should not, disqualify the case from being counted as a ‘strike’ for purposes of § 1915(g)”).
88. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-
(D) (2000); see also David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 346 (1st Cir. 2003) (“One of AEDPA’s main
purposes was to compel habeas petitions to be field promptly after conviction and direct review,
to limit the number, and to permit delayed or second petitions only in fairly narrow and explicitly
defined circumstances.”); Miller v. N.J. Dep’t of Corrs., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting
that Congress enacted AEDPA, “in relevant part to curb the abuse of the writ of habeas corpus”).
dismisses even a single cause of action for frivolousness or failure to state a valid
claim.   In these courts, deciphering a pro se party’s complaint can often create87
hidden consequences extending far beyond the case itself.  For example, a pro se
party could, hypothetically, assert five claims, prevail on four, and suffer
dismissal of one.  The lone dismissal could forever jeopardize pauper status for
the litigant even though he had prevailed in the suit.  In these circumstances, the
pro se litigant would suffer even without a hint of having abused his pauper
status.
The danger is heightened by the treacherous task of deciding which claims
were intended by the plaintiff and which were not.  In the hypothetical situation,
the pro se litigant might never have intended to assert the single cause of action
that was dismissed.  The courts, benign in purpose, might be forever penalizing
the same litigants who were the intended beneficiaries of such judicial
generosity.
D.  The AEDPA’s Impact on Judicial Construction of Pro Se Petitions
In 1996, Congress set out to limit habeas litigation.   Prior to 1996, federal88
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89. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1994).
90. See id. § 2244(a)-(b); RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS R. 9(b) (as amended to Feb. 1, 1995); see also Kramer v. Butler, 845 F.2d 1291,
1295 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hether a habeas petition is dismissed as an abuse of the writ under Rule
9(b) is to a large extent discretionary rather than automatic or mandatory.”) (citation omitted).
91. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3), 2255 (2000).
92. See id.
93. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
94. See id. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that under the majority’s holding “habeas
corpus is now considered the prisoner’s exclusive remedy”).
95. The reason for the dilemma is this:  an inmate files a 1983 action and he pays his filing
fee.  Unfortunately, he should have filed a habeas petition and he cannot proceed on his claim under
1983.  So, at this point, the court dismisses the 1983 action, and the prisoner loses the filing fee,
and he does not get a hearing on his claim.  To avoid this harsh result, the court could convert or
recharacterize the claim as a habeas action, and the court could now go ahead and hear the merits
of his claim.  As the Supreme Court noted in Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003),
“[f]ederal courts sometimes will ignore the legal label that a [pro se] litigant attaches to a motion
and recharacterize the motion in order to place it within a different legal category.”
96. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text; see also Spillman v. Cully, No. 08-CV-
008M, 2008 WL 495512 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2008) (finding § 1983 complaint should be
recharacterized as a habeas petition and notifying plaintiff of intent to do so unless plaintiff advises
the court otherwise); Brown v. Guiney, No. 06-CV-555, 2006 WL 1144499 (W.D.N.Y. April 25,
2006) (same).  For cases in which courts decline to recharacterize § 1983 complaints as habeas
petitions, see Clay v. Smith, No. CIV-08-85-W, 2008 WL 4533993 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 2, 2008);
courts could dismiss repetitious habeas filings on grounds that they involved an
abuse of the writ.   Dismissal was generally not mandatory and courts had89
almost no guidance on how to exercise their discretion.   Through the AEDPA,90
Congress created a framework that left little room for successive habeas petitions
and motions for vacatur of a sentence.  One could only file a second or
successive habeas petition or motion for vacatur of a sentence if he satisfied a
narrow set of criteria and obtained advance authorization by the court of
appeals.91
The result was an array of new legislative consequences when a prisoner had
already filed a habeas petition or motion to vacate the sentence.   However, prior92
to passage of the AEDPA, the courts had accumulated twenty-three years of
precedent on when a pleading should be interpreted as a habeas petition or
motion to vacate the sentence.  With this precedent in place, passage of the 1996
statute created a reminder of the dangers in the judiciary’s proactive reading of
pro se pleadings.
The anomaly is largely rooted in Preiser v. Rodriguez  in which the Supreme93
Court held that a writ of habeas corpus constituted the exclusive remedy when
one challenged the fact or duration of confinement.   When an inmate asserted94
such a challenge through other means, such as a civil rights action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts faced a dilemma.   One alternative was to95
take the inmate’s filing fee and dismiss the action without reaching the merits.96
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Foster v. Berghuis, No. 1:07-cv-950, 2008 WL 4426337 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2008); Crow v.
Quarterman, No. G-07-0096, 2008 WL 3539738 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2008).
97. See, e.g., Raineri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 100  (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that “when
a district court, acting sua sponte, converts a post-conviction motion filed under some other statute
or rule into a section 2255 petition without notice and an opportunity to be heard . . . the
recharacterized motion ordinarily will not count as a ‘first’ habeas petition sufficient to trigger
AEDPA’s gatekeeping requirements”).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000).
99. E.g., Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Daniels v.
United States, 254 F.3d 1180, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762,
781-83 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1999).
100. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
101. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255 (2000).
102. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Tolliver, Case No. CR-92-20008-01 (W.D.
La. Apr. 16, 1993).
103. Motion to Dismiss 18 U.S.C. 924(C), Tolliver v. United States, No. CR-92-20008-01
(W.D. La. May 20, 1996).
104. Mr. Tolliver wrote to the court clerk:
I’m writing in response to the Government’s response to my Motion to Dismiss 18
U.S.C. 924(C)1.  First, my motion wasn’t suppose [sic] to be filed as a 2255 motion,
because I sent a letter in dated 6-9-96 explaining that.  So, please take this letter as an
objection to my motion being filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255.  Instead, this motion should
be construed as a motion for a reduction of sentence Pursuant to 3582, Not a 2255.
Also, I have other issues I plan to bring up in the future under Section 2255, and this
Some courts saw this alternative as incompatible with Haines and routinely
recharacterized such actions as habeas petitions.   The process appears to supply97
courts with a fair means to reach the merits of the claim, recognizing the pro se
litigant’s difficulties and the guidance offered in Haines.
The problem was that these courts could not anticipate legislative changes
which would turn this benign process of recharacterization into a dangerous
penalty for pro se litigants.  For example, the AEDPA requires courts to address
whether an action is “second or successive” even when the proponent has sought
habeas relief or vacatur of the sentence prior to enactment of the law.   Courts98
frequently answered in the affirmative.   Thus, when a court recharacterized an99
action prior to 1996 as a habeas petition or motion for vacatur of a sentence, the
litigant now needed the appellate court’s permission before he could file another
habeas petition.   Under the statute, this permission was available only in100
narrow circumstances.   Thus, recharacterization of pleadings frequently101
disadvantaged the same people that the courts had hoped to protect.
An example of the anomaly is the litigation brought by Sylvester Tolliver.
In 1993, Mr. Tolliver was convicted of three criminal counts, including violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)(1).   Only days after enactment of the 1996 habeas law,102
Mr. Tolliver filed a motion to dismiss one of the counts on which he was
convicted.   Even before the court ruled, Mr. Tolliver objected to103
characterization of the motion as one filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.104
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motion has been used by several inmates and this is the first time it has been interpreted
as a 2255, so please don’t file it as such.
Letter from S. Tolliver to Court Clerk, United States v. Tolliver, No. CR-92-20008-01 (docketed
July 15, 1996).
105. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Tolliver, Case No. CR-92-20008-01 (W.D.
La. July 8, 1996).
106. In re Tolliver, 97 F.3d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
107. Id.; see supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (discussing the three strikes rule as
strictly applied).
108. In re Tolliver, 97 F.3d at 90.
109. See Carlson Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., No. 04-CV-3368, 2006 WL
2917173, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2006) (stating that motions to strike documents, other than
pleadings, would be denied because “there is no such thing”); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury Co.,
264 F. Supp. 2d 710, 711 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (denying a motion to dismiss under the specified state
statute, as “[t]here is no such thing” under federal procedural law).
110. Raineri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir. 2000).
111. For example, although a pro se plaintiff may not know the correct language or style of
a claim for relief that a lawyer would use, the court will construe the complaint so as to allow the
complaint to go forward.  Marshall v. Brierley, 461 F.2d 929, 930 (3rd Cir. 1972) (court reviewed
complaint filed by a prisoner with “only minimal literary skills” and found sufficient grounds to
allow complaint to go forward).  Likewise in recharacterizing 1983 actions as habeas proceedings
and advising the plaintiff of this action, the court is directing the plaintiff towards the correct legal
action to pursue.  See, e.g., Spillman v. Cully, No. 08-CV-008M, 2008 WL 495512 (W.D.N.Y. Feb.
15, 2008); Brown v. Guiney, No. 06-CV-55S, 2006 WL 1144499 (W.D.N.Y. April 25, 2006) (both
finding § 1983 complaint should be recharacterized as a habeas petition and notifying plaintiff of
Nonetheless, the court treated the motion as one for vacatur of the sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.   Mr. Tolliver later wanted to file a second motion under §105
2255, and the federal appeals court denied leave.   In doing so, the court said106
that Mr. Tolliver could not file a second motion under § 2255 even though he had
never intended to file one and his prior motion had addressed only one of three
counts.   The federal appeals court reasoned that Mr. Tolliver’s motion had to107
arise under § 2255 even though he called the document a “motion to dismiss.”108
The court’s effort to help Mr. Tolliver did him little good.  If the document
had been treated as a motion to dismiss, the court presumably would have denied
relief.   However, such treatment would have allowed refiling of the motion109
under its proper label, with inclusion of all grounds and counts that Mr. Tolliver
wanted to address.  The result, instead, involved an anomaly.  As the First Circuit
put it, by “striv[ing] to balance the scales of justice” through recharacterization,
the court “preclud[ed] the pleader from any opportunity to litigate potentially
meritorious constitutional claims.”110
Haines v. Kerner did not create the anomaly.  Instead, the anomaly arose
from the courts’ use of Haines as an equalizer in the litigation.  The courts hoped
not only to remove legal obstacles for inmates, but also to give them the benefit
of strategic choices that presumably would have been made with legal
representation.   One could only guess whether these predictions would have111
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intent to do so unless plaintiff advises the court otherwise).
112. The reason it could not harm them is that the second and successive rules of habeas
petitions were different pre-AEDPA and the plaintiffs would not have been adversely affected under
the old rules.  The consequences of the change in habeas rules in the AEDPA are discussed in
Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 377 (2003), in which the Supreme Court stated:
Under a longstanding practice, a court sometimes treats as a request for habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 a motion that a [pro se] federal prisoner has labeled differently.
Such recharacterization can have serious consequences for the prisoner, for it subjects
any subsequent motion under § 2255 to the restrictive conditions that federal law
imposes upon a “second or successive” (but not upon a first) federal habeas motion.  §
2255, ¶ 8.  In light of these consequences, we hold that the court cannot so
recharacterize a [pro se] litigant's motion as the litigant's first § 2255 motion unless the
court informs the litigant of its intent to recharacterize, warns the litigant that the
recharacterization will subject subsequent § 2255 motions to the law's “second or
successive” restrictions, and provides the litigant with an opportunity to withdraw, or
to amend, the filing. Where these things are not done, a recharacterized motion will not
count as a § 2255 motion for purposes of applying § 2255's “second or successive”
provision.
Id.  As a result, when a court now wishes to recharacterize a complaint as a petition, it must advise
the plaintiff.  Unfortunately, this requirement does not help plaintiffs whose complaints were
recharacterized prior to Castro.
113. See United States v. Palmer, 296 F.3d 1135, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The AEDPA
significantly changed the landscape.”).
114. See generally Castro, 540 U.S. 375.
115. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
[A] conversion, initially justified because it harmlessly assisted the prisoner-movant in
dealing with legal technicalities, may result in a disastrous deprivation of a future
opportunity to have a well-justified grievance adjudicated.  The court’s act of
conversion which we approved under pre-AEDPA law because it was useful and
harmless might, under AEDPA’s new law, become extraordinarily harmful to a
prisoner’s rights.  A prisoner convicted pursuant to unconstitutional proceedings might
lose the right to have a single petition for habeas corpus adjudicated, solely by reason
of a district court’s having incorrectly recharacterized some prior motion as one brought
under § 2255.
Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
materialized if the inmates had been represented.
As a result, courts used assumptions to make their guesswork as meaningful
as possible.  Prior to 1996, the assumptions could help inmates, but not harm
them.   Adoption of the AEDPA changed that legal landscape.   If courts had112 113
not sought to level the playing field, many pro se litigants would have been able
to file future habeas petitions or motions to vacate a sentence without the need
for judicial permission.   With the new legal consequences created by Congress,114
the judiciary’s proactive effort to help pro se litigants created an unwanted,
undeserved burden for them.115
The inequity is traceable to the judiciary’s process of treating pleadings
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116. Compare AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 26 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “advocacy” as
“[t]he act of pleading or arguing in favor of something, such as a cause, idea, or policy; active
support”), with id. at 25 (defining “adjudicate” as “[t]o hear and settle (a case) by judicial
procedure”).
117. Castro, 540 U.S. at 383.
118. Id. (discussing the implications of a district court’s characterization in light of 28 U.S.C.
2255 (2006)).
119. See, e.g., Yellowbear v. Wyo. Attorney Gen., 525 F.3d 921, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2008)
(requiring the Castro warnings before recharacterization as a habeas petition brought under 28
U.S.C. § 2254); Martin v. Overton, 2004 FED App. 0413P, 391 F.3d 710, 712-13 (6th Cir. 2004)
(requiring disclosure and consent before the court can sua sponte convert a pleading to a habeas
petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)); Simon v. United States, 359 F.3d 139, 145 (2d
Cir. 2004) (requiring the same disclosure and warnings when a motion is converted to a habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) and 41(a)(2) (requiring court approval for amendments and
voluntary dismissals in certain situations).  Cf. RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS R. 12 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal
Procedure may be applied in actions involving 28 U.S.C. § 2255).  The Supreme Court’s procedure
implicitly requires the district court to permit amendment or dismissal whenever a pleading is
recharacterized as an initial motion under Section 2255.  Castro, 540 U.S. at 303 (noting that the
district court should “provide the litigant the opportunity to withdraw the motion or to amend it so
that it contains all the § 2255 claims he believes he has”).
121. Castro, 540 U.S. at 377.
122. See United States v. Ceballos-Martinez, 387 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating
that the Tenth Circuit had never interpreted principles of liberal construction for pro se litigants to
based on what would have benefitted the pro se litigant rather than what he or she
had actually intended.  This methodology is traditionally aligned with advocacy
rather than adjudication.116
Courts have struggled to avoid this inequity in various ways.  For example,
the Supreme Court has prohibited recharacterization of a pleading as an initial
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the absence of disclosure regarding the district
court’s intent.   The Court warned that recharacterization could render a117
subsequent motion “second or successive,” so the litigant must be provided an
opportunity to withdraw or to amend the filing.   Many courts have applied the118
same principle to disclosures and warnings to the litigant whenever a pleading
is recharacterized as an initial habeas petition.   This practice avoids the119
anomaly for prisoners, like Mr. Tolliver, whose motions are recharacterized to
their detriment.  However, this practice further compromises the judiciary’s role
as an impartial arbiter, as the court becomes a counselor for the litigant and gives
him an opportunity to amend or withdraw a pleading without any basis in either
the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure.120
When the district court fails to give the required warnings, a subsequent
pleading will not be considered a “second or successive” motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.   This approach effectively disregards the congressional will for121
consideration of certain pleadings as second or successive.122
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ignore “congressionally established procedural rules”).
123. See supra Part II.C.
124. See supra Part II.D.
125. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000).
126. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1915e(a) (2000).
127. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Castro, 540 U.S. 375 (2003).
129. See Jon O. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94
YALE L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985) [hereinafter Newman, Rethinking Fairness] (“Fairness is the
fundamental concept that guides our thinking [as Judges] about substantive and procedural law.”).
130. See, e.g., Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the
Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 515 (2002) (“[C]ourts and
commentators are thus coming to recognize the authority, if not the responsibility, of a judge to
depart from the ethical norms of adversarial justice in order to ensure a fair and accurate result and,
in particular, to take an activist stance in cases involving unrepresented litigants.”); Newman,
Rethinking Fairness, supra note 129, at 1649 (“[A]lthough we scrupulously strive to achieve a fair
A pleading is whatever it is, regardless of what the court does.  The
legislative consequences for the pleader should not depend on whether the judge
decides to leave the pleading alone or treat it as something other than what the
proponent said it was.  With injection of the judge’s action into a determination
of legislative consequences, the judicial role changes from umpire to advocate.
And with this change comes the unfortunate loss of the judge’s neutrality.
III.  THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PLRA AND AEDPA
With this intangible loss of a judge’s neutrality, the courts may be creating
unintended penalties for the litigants who the courts are paradoxically trying to
help.  The 1996 changes in the PLRA  and AEDPA  illustrate these dangers.123 124
The 1996 amendments governing pauper status,  exhaustion of administrative125
remedies,  and second and successive habeas petitions and motions under 28126
U.S.C. § 2255  created new consequences for prior recipients of judicial127
paternalism.  In bestowing these acts of paternalism, the courts may not have
foreseen the changes ultimately taking place in 1996.  Moreover, the courts
currently engaging in judicial paternalism may not foresee future changes.
There is no definitive solution to the minefield of potential problems wrought
by benevolence for pro se litigants.  The futility is seen in the courts’ current
efforts to alleviate these problems through the invention of a requirement for
warnings or a unilateral determination about the fairness of treating a petition or
motion as second or successive once another court has engaged in
recharacterization.128
The minefield of dilemmas results from the slippage in the courts’
appreciation for the adversarial system.  As the arbiters of the system, judges
often view the ultimate objective as fairness.   The difficulty arises, however,129
from an occasional failure to distinguish between fairness of the process and
fairness of individual results.   As judges frequently recognize, a pro se litigant130
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outcome in the individual dispute, we rarely consider how to be fair to all who use or would like
to use the litigation system.”).
131. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
132. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals urged equal treatment for pro se litigants in ordinary
civil cases, stating, “Trial courts generally do not intervene to save litigants from their choice of
counsel, even when the lawyer loses the case because he fails to file opposing papers.  A litigant
who chooses himself as legal representative should be treated no differently.”  Jacobsen v. Filler,
790 F.2d 1362, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
133. See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 521 (2007) (“[T]he reality on the ground is that, even
today, no two trials look exactly alike, not only because the particular facts of the dispute are
different, but also because some degree of customization already happens.”). 
134. Newman, Rethinking Fairness, supra note 129, at 1648.
135. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 664 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] judge is constrained by a duty
of impartiality, and whatever he might do to help an unrepresented litigant, he cannot be that
individual’s advocate.”); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2007) (“A judge
shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.”).
136. Judges are prohibited from practicing law.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.10
(2007) (“A judge shall not practice law.”); CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon
5(F) (“A judge should not practice law.”).  Giving legal advice is a basic characteristic of legal
practice, as the Supreme Court noted: “Explaining the details of federal habeas procedure and
calculating statutes of limitations are tasks normally and properly performed by trained counsel as
a matter of course.  Requiring district courts to advise a [pro se] litigant in such a manner would
undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.”  Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231
(2004); see also In re Reynoso, 477 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2007) (remarking that under state
law, the practice of law generally includes “legal advice”).  Thus, a judge cannot ethically give legal
advice to any of the parties, regardless of whether they are pro se.  See Engler, supra note 48, at
ordinarily lacks the knowledge and ability of his opposing attorney.   However,131
even when both sides are represented, the attorneys are often unequal in
ability,  just as some witnesses, clients, and jurors are better than others.   As132 133
one federal appellate judge remarked:
Trials are not clinical investigations, performed under laboratory
conditions.  They are human confrontations, subject to all the normal
risks of human error and with the risks compounded by the dramatic
intensity of the event, the contentiousness of the adversary process, and
the distortions that sometimes arise from disparity in talent and resources
of the contending sides.134
The effort to equalize adversarial ability is a futile endeavor, but the
hopelessness of the task is not the greatest danger.  Instead, the greater danger is
the loosening of the well-designed constraints on the role of the judiciary in the
adversarial process.  Judges are not advocates or advisors.  When judges adopt
these roles, they violate deeply embedded legal principles.  For example,
advocacy runs afoul of the judge’s duty of impartiality.   Additionally, giving135
legal advice is prohibited by multiple canons of judicial conduct.   Finally,136
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1988 (“The rules primarily prohibit . . . court players from giving legal advice to unrepresented
litigants.”).
137. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“It is . . . familiar learning that no
justiciable ‘controversy’ exists when parties . . . ask for an advisory opinion . . . .”) (citation
omitted); see also Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989-90 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (noting that federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions and that “judges are not authorized
to issue legal advice”).
138. One commentator explains:
Justice is blind and employs scales to ensure procedural fairness, an ideal fundamental
to the Constitution’s due process tradition.  Procedure constrains judicial sight and
provides criteria of relevance for what kinds of things Justitia might properly see.  Like
the mechanics of paired scales, procedure provides the mechanics for fair outcomes
through the blind weighing of competing claims.
Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 27 (2007). 
139. For example, in 2007, the American Bar Association approved a comment to accompany
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which would allow judges “to make reasonable
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.”
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (2007).  The Reporter’s Explanation of Changes
noted that the comment was designed to “level[] the playing field” by ensuring a “fair hearing” but
not “an unfair advantage” for pro se litigants.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2,
reporter’s explanation of changes cmt. 4 (2007), available at www.abanet.org/judicialethics/mcjc-
2007.pdf.
140. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
142. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (“In interpreting a pro se
complaint, . . . our task is not to discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff, but what the words
in the complaint mean.”).
warnings to litigants closely resemble the sort of “advisory opinions” prohibited
in Article III of the United States Constitution.137
The courts’ attempts to advocate, counsel, and warn stem from an admirable
objective—fairness.  But the judge’s role in our system is to ensure fairness of
the process rather than fairness to an individual case.   Otherwise, the judge’s138
task is one of futility because endless inequities exist in any case.
IV.  PROPER INTERPRETATION AND THE DIMINISHED
IMPORTANCE OF HAINES V. KERNER
To reverse the thirty-six year distortion of Haines, courts must understand
the source.  Many courts have afforded special treatment to equalize the legal
resources available to litigants.   Equalization of resources would require139
participation of the judge as an advocate and advisor.   With this loss in140
neutrality, courts risk unintended problems for pro se litigants and the assumption
of legislative roles.141
The key to construction of pro se pleadings involves an understanding of
what the litigant has said.   When a litigant is unrepresented, he may be unable142
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143. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) (noting that pro se complaints
are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).
144. So named because the hearings were established in Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th
Cir. 1985), abrogated by Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
145. An example of the procedure is reflected in Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003 (5th Cir. 1998).
There the appeals court held that the magistrate judge had acted within his discretion in developing
and ultimately dismissing a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claims.  Id. at 1005.  The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals went on to explain:
This is quite a different thing from saying that the magistrate judge has a duty to
interrogate the pro se plaintiff in such a way as to exhaust conceivable causes of action.
The magistrate judge has no such duty.  Instead, the Spears procedure affords the
plaintiff an opportunity to verbalize his complaints, in a manner of communication more
comfortable to many prisoners.  But the plaintiff remains the master of his complaint
and is, in the end, the person responsible for articulating the facts that give rise to a
cognizable claim.
Id. at 1005-06.
to clearly express himself to a court.  As a result, Haines required the courts to
show some flexibility in their interpretation of a pro se litigant’s pleadings.143
Courts have ample resources available to determine the pro se party’s intent.
For example, in the Fifth Circuit, courts conduct Spears hearings  to assist in144
screening prisoner complaints for frivolousness or failure to state a valid claim.145
These proceedings can easily be modified to permit the judge to inquire into the
pleader’s intent.
Once the court learns the pleader’s intent, the task of interpretation is
complete.  Further steps to help the pro se litigant involve advocacy and counsel
rather than interpretation.  Such steps are, therefore, inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
The morass of approaches to pro se litigation reflects a long-standing
ambivalence over pleading standards and the judge’s role in the adversarial
process.  As pleading standards softened, courts struggled with how to address
fanciful suits brought by unrepresented parties.  With this internal struggle,
judges understandably hoped to relieve pro se litigants of endless procedural
traps when the underlying claims appeared meritorious.  In this setting, the
Supreme Court innocuously noted the claimant’s pro se status in Haines v.
Kerner, and lower courts set out to use this phrase to vindicate an infinite set of
views about how to assess pleading standards and how to help unrepresented
parties navigate various procedural traps.  These efforts proved not only futile,
but also counter-productive.  In the process, the courts compromised their own
neutrality and limited role.
The recent sharpening of pleading standards should relieve judges of these
conflicts.  Judges no longer enjoy open license to devise their own ways of
dealing with implausible suits by pro se litigants.  The inevitable and long-
overdue result is the judiciary’s return to its traditional function as the neutral
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arbiter of fairness in the litigation process.  Like everyone else, some pro se
litigants will achieve fair results and others will not, but equality in treatment will
at least ensure fairness in the process for everyone.
